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SOME BUSINESS PROBLEMS IN PLANNING
WILLS FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF
THE FIDUCIARY
By Leroy McWhinney, Vice President of
The International Trust Company
Summarized from a talk before the Law Club
HE administration of the estate of a deceased person,
and, more particularly, the management and ultimate
distribution of a testamentary trust fund, involves not
only questions of probate practice and the construction of instruments, but a variety of practical business problems. The
possibility of a business-like and satisfactory management of
the property of an estate depends to a considerable extent upon
the degree of foresight possessed by the draftsman in the
preparation of the will and upon the scope and precision of
those clauses of the document which have to do with the powers of the executor and the trustee in the management and
distribution of the estate.
Naturally enough, the importance of such provisions
looms larger to those constantly engaged in the management
of estates than to those whose work is primarily with the drafting of the instruments and the study of the legal principles
involved. To the prospective executor and trustee, the plan
of distribution of the testator's estate is of little or no interest,
if it is capable of execution in practice, but the plan of business administration is of the utmost importance. On the
soundness of the latter depends the opportunity of the estate
manager to best protect the estate from loss, to make it productive, to minimize expenses, and to avoid litigation.
The executive of a trust company, or of a bank with trust
powers, looks upon the provisions of a will, under which his
institution is ultimately to act as executor or trustee, from sub-
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stantially the same point of view as he regards any contract,
or other document, calling for the services of his trust organization, whether that instrument be in the form of escrow
instructions, safe-keeping instructions, a trust agreement with
a living customer, or a corporate mortgage. While his institution is operated to earn fair compensation for business
services rendered, its success depends upon the quality of its
work; and, if its authority is incomplete, or unnecessarily
restricted, it cannot function properly. In such case its position is similar to that of a building contractor bound to follow
faulty specifications.
When the trusteeship under a corporate mortgage securing a bond issue is tendered to a trust company, the first condition to be imposed by the trustee is that the enterprise shall
be legitimate, and that the instrument shall be so planned as
to afford protection to the security holders in a degree consistent with sound business practice. Having determined such
factors, the next condition is that the provisions of the instrument shall be clear and workable. The acceptance by the
trust company of a corporate mortgage in which the directions as to conditions and procedure under, and in accordance
with, which the bonds may be called, are vague, uncertain, or
contradictory, not only makes trouble for the trustee but results in dissatisfaction and, probably, in financial loss to both
the bondholders and the corporation.
When securities are deposited with a trustee, whether to
secure some obligation of the depositor, or for the purpose of
management in behalf of the depositor and the beneficiaries
and ultimate distribution to the beneficiaries, the careful trustee will see to it, in so far as practical, that those clauses which
define the manner in which the property may be managed,
invested, and otherwise dealt with are sufficient to permit
management consistent with good business practice. Hence,
it is the desire of the trustee, and is ordinarily for the best
interest of the customer, that, wherever conditions will permit, the trustee should review the instrument before it is
signed by the customer, and this is even more important in
the case of wills than in the case of escrow instructions, corporate mortgages, etc. Usually the trustee may reject or bring
about amendment of the inter vivos instrument, but it hesi-
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tates to reject, and cannot amend, the will of a dead testator.
In a recent discussion of these subjects before the Law
Club of Denver, the writer of this article outlined a number
of business problems commonly arising in the administration
of estates to which consideration might properly be given in
the preparation of wills, particularly where the will provides
for the creation of a trust estate. Reasonable limits for this
article make it necessary to select only a few of such points for
mention here; and even with such limitation the following
enumeration can be but an index. In a given plan of distribution, a majority of such factors may require treatment. In
some other plan, only a few of the problems thus suggested
may be of importance. If below a particular manner of treatment of any problem is mentioned, the method referred to is
but illustration. Obviously, each case must be separately considered. The intention is not to say what shall be done, but
to emphasize the importance of doing something.
Inheritance Taxes
The estate tax imposed by the Federal Government is a
charge against the estate as a unit. Inheritance taxes are
charges against individual legatees or beneficiaries, and the
funds for the payment thereof must be found by the executor
or trustee, either by collecting the same from the beneficiary
or by withholding the same from his distributive share. If
the beneficiary is entitled to receive only income, and has no
other available assets, the tax can be paid only by diverting
the income, which ordinarily is not the testator's intention. If
the beneficiary is the remainderman, and particularly if lhis
remainder is conditional, he is unwilling, if not unable, to
advance the tax before he receives the legacy. Prior to the
Colorado Inheritance Tax Act of 1927, it was frequently
necessary, in the case of life beneficiaries entitled to income,
to divert the income; and it was a somewhat doubtful practice
to pay the tax on the remainderman from the principal of the
trust fund. Under subdivision 5 of section 3 of the Act of
1927, it is possible that, in the case of life estates, the tax on
the beneficial interest of both the life tenant and the remainderman may be taken from the corpus. However, this section
has not been construed and, of course, may be at any time
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repealed. It is, therefore, usually a wise course to provide
in the will that the inheritance taxes on the interest of life
tenants and remaindermen shall be paid from the corpus of
the trust fund, and it is frequently desirable to provide that
all inheritance taxes on all legacies shall be paid from the residue of the estate like an expense of administration.
General Powers of Management
With rare exceptions, the trustee of any trust may be
called upon to make good title to real or personal property;
to borrow money; to mortgage or pledge assets for the refunding of old obligations or the raising of new funds; and to lease
real property. Full and unqualified power for such purposes
should be vested in the trustee, to the end that there may be
no cloud upon its title and that there may be the minimum of
court procedure required. In many cases these general powers should also include authority to improve real estate.
Division in Kind
Ordinarily, where an estate, composed of a variety of
securities, is to be divided among a number of adults, they
will agree upon a division in kind in order to save commissions and other expenses involved in a conversion into cash.
However, if there are minors, or incompetent adults, it may
prove difficult to obtain such an agreement. Consequently,
express authority in the trustee to appraise the several items
and to make a division in kind, either on final division or on
division into separate funds, may result in substantial economies.
Income
No question of administration is fraught with more difficulty than the determination of what constitutes income, and
yet most of the uncertainties commonly presented may be
eliminated in advance by appropriate directions, and litigation as to others may be avoided by expressly vesting reasonable discretion in the trustee. For example, if a six per cent
bond is bought at a premium, shall the face yield of the bond
be treated as income, or shall a sufficient part of the six per
cent yield be withheld and added to principal to offset the
premium when the bond is retired at par? The principal
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may be protected either by at once charging the entire premium to the income account or by amortizing it in equal portions over the period between the date of purchase and the
maturity of the bond. If the bond is bought at a discount, the
face return is doubtless income, but there has been bitter litigation over the disposition of the amount of the discount
when the bond is paid at par. The prevailing rule is that
such discount is principal. It is common practice to treat
stock dividends as principal but with the modern tendency of
public utility corporations to pay a part of their current distribution of dividends in the form of stock, or scrip for stock,
the testator who contemplates that his trustee will hold any
substantial blocks of such stock should seriously consider the
advisability of directing that all, or part, of stock dividends
should be treated as income. Other, and more intricate, questions arise out of the maintenance of reserves from current income for the payment of taxes to become due in the next calendar year, for the making of repairs, or improvements, on
real estate, or for the amortization of existing improvements
which may have to be replaced during the term of the trust.
In this connection, it may also be rioted that our own courts
have so far declined to decide whether general taxes on nonproductive property are chargeable to income or to principal,
thus leaving open another question which may properly be
answered in advance.
The Supreme Court of Colorado has settled for our jurisdiction the long mooted question as to the date from which
income shall begin to accrue for the use of life beneficiaries
as being the date of death rather than the date when the estate
is transferred from the executor to the trustee. The rule is
not so well settled in all other jurisdictions, and the time when
income shall cease presents another complication. It is perhaps the general rule that, upon the death of a life beneficiary,
income in the hands of a trustee awaiting distribution, interest
accrued upon bonds and notes, and dividends declared but
not paid, belong to the estate of the deceased life beneficiary
rather than to the succeeding life tenant.or to the remainderman. Ordinarily, no such result is contemplated or desired
by the testator, and, if the amount is substantial, it means the
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administration of the estate of the life beneficiary which might
otherwise have been avoided.
Emergency or Special Uses of Principal
Unless the estate is very large, it is usually wise to vest in
the trustee broad discretion to go into the principal for the
relief of life beneficiaries when the income proves insufficient
due to unexpected contingencies, and it is seldom wise to attempt to enumerate or define the contingencies, although illness, change in the value of money, and education of children,
are typical illustrations. More serious is the question regarding the payment of expenses of last illness and funeral raised
upon the death of a life beneficiary who is entirely dependent
upon the income from the fund. Even though there be no
direction in the will to terminate the income at death, there
is no certainty that there will be any accrued income. Consequently, prudence dictates that there be express authority
in the trustee to pay such expenses from the fund before passing it to the next beneficiary.
Investments
It is a cardinal rule that the testator should settle upon
the scope of the investment authority to be given, and not
allow the will to be silent or to dispose of the point in general
or in ambiguous terms. It is perhaps the weight of authority
that general language purporting to permit the trustee to
invest in its discretion is equivalent to silence, and that in
either case the trustee will be restricted to such investments
as the applicable statutes may, from time to time, permit. If
the testator intends that the statutes should govern, the trustee
will welcome an unqualified statement to that effect, but if the
testator does not so desire, then the instrument should state
the converse in unequivocable language and proceed either
to give the trustee unlimited discretion, or to define the limits
within which the trustee may act. As a matter of ordinary
business prudence, it is usually unwise to limit the trustee by
the statutes. For this there are many reasons, of which it is
sufficient to mention two:
1st: The constitution of the State of Colorado prohibits
the legislature from authorizing any trustee to investment in
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either the stocks or the bonds of any private corporation, thus
closing the door to corporate bonds which are usually deemed
of the highest desirability.
2nd: The securities made eligible by the present statute
are frequently in such demand (for use in trust estates, or by
reason of outside competition for Colorado mortgages) as to
force the average interest yield thereon to a level below that
returned by other equally desirable investments.
The drafting of a formula for investment is difficult because the form and conventional ear-marks of sound investments change with the development of American business.
Nevertheless, it is feasible to provide some restrictions of a
practical nature when the testator so prefers. In such cases,
however, an expert in investments should be consulted as to
the language to be used. There is an apparently growing
tendency on the part of the most experienced investors to leave
the trustee to its uncontrolled discretion in the selection of
securities, but that is obviously a question which each testator
must settle for himself. The point in which the lawyer and
the trust manager are interested is that the testator shall settle
the question, and that his instructions shall be clear and workable.
That which a trustee may not purchase for reinvestment
it may not retain as a permanent investment. Frequently a
testator who has failed to authorize reinvestments in either
corporate bonds or corporate stocks will leave an estate soundly invested in both such bonds and stocks, in the belief that
all, or the larger part thereof, will be indefinitely retained;
or, at least, that such securities will not be precipitately sold
in what the testator would have considered a low market. Yet
the executor or trustee finds itself facing the danger that, unless it proceeds to prompt liquidation, it will be responsible
for shrinkage in value. It is usually wise to expressly authorize the fiduciary to retain for such time as it deems wise any
property of any character owned by the testator at his death
or which comes into his estate during the process of its administration by the executor, without liability for loss which
may result from such retention. The necessity for such precaution is, of course, emphasized where the testator owns
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stock in a close corporation, the liquidation of which may be
difficult or entirely undesirable.
Revenue Laws
The existing ad valorem property tax in Colorado is applicable to securities, other than those expressly exempted, and
this condition often presents a practical restriction on the
scope of the trustee's investments, regardless of the language
of the will. For example, corporate bonds secured by assets
outside of the State of Colorado, and, indeed, all mortgages
on property outside of the State of Colorado, are taxable.
The rate of taxation in Denver is such as to absorb more than
half of the average income from iuch securities, and, consequently, to make them impossible as investments for probate
trusts. The executor encounters this tax at the threshold of
his duties. Because the tax is in effect confiscatory, it is well
known that the individual security holder does not, and cannot, return such securities for taxation; but upon his death
these holdings are unavoidably disclosed, and it is now the
practice of the assessor to make a retroactive assessment thereon as well as to levy a continuing tax while they are retained
by the estate. It is generally agreed that such tax upon securities is wrong in principle and that it works a very great
injustice because of its unequal application. With this premise established, it seems reasonably certain that tax reform
in this particular cannot long be postponed, and, therefore, a
wise course to disregard this condition in the planning of investment clauses for trusts to be administered in the future.
Reorganizations
It is conceivable that in the administration of any trust,
however carefully managed, a real estate mortgage may require foreclosure, or a corporate bond (whether left to the
trustee by the testator or purchased by the trustee) may go
into default with resulting reorganization of the company.
In such case the trustee may be called upon, in order to protect the investment, to receive and indefinitely retain the proceeds of such foreclosure or reorganization. These proceeds
may be in real estate, or they may be partly in first lien bonds,
partly in junior lien bonds, and partly in stock. If the trustee
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has actually unlimited discretion in investment, it will be confronted with no serious problem in accepting and retaining
such proceeds of reorganization; but if its investment authority has been limited, and the property resulting from the foreclosure or reorganization does not fall within such limits, the
trustee may well hesitate regarding its authority to accept such
proceeds at all, and be driven to the alternative of either abandoning the property or accepting some apparently inadequate
cash settlement. Consequently, where the investment authority of the trustee is restricted, there should be special authority
to participate in such reorganizations, and to take and hold
the proceeds thereof.

THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S
PRESIDENT EXPRESSES AN OPINION

WHEN

the Denver Bar Association presented a copy
of its Year Book to Gurney E. Newlin of Los Angeles,
President of the American Bar Association, he wrote:

"This is of extreme interest to me, particularly in view of the fact
that it is the most artistic book that I have ever seen publshed by any Association, and issued in the most pleasing form."

This is praise from Sir Hubert, and accordingly Mr.
Toll has secured Mr. Newlin's permission to print this judgment for the gratification of the members of our Association.

DELIVERY OF DEEDS
By Albert J. Gould, Jr., of the Denver Bar
HERE is no presumption of the delivery of a deed
.jT where it is not recorded until long after its date ** "
The foregoing words were taken verbatim from page
442 of the opinion of the Supreme Court of Colorado, written
by Mr. Justice Campbell, in the case of Larison vs. Taylor,
decided March 19, 1928, and reported in 83 Colorado Reports
at page 430.
The result of this decision is far reaching. If the statutory presumption of the delivery of a deed which is created
by its acknowledgment before a proper officer and by recording it is to be destroyed by the lapse of considerable time between the date of its execution and the date of recording, we
must discontinue the common practice of placing deeds of
conveyance in escrow pending payment by the purchaser of
the balance of the purchase price under a written contract for
the purchase of real property if the final payment is not to be
made until a "long time" after the execution of the deed, unless we provide some means of making record proof of final
delivery.
In the above mentioned case a widow sued her married
daughter to have canceled and discharged of record a warranty deed to said daughter as grantee, which deed the widow
had executed on April 11, 1919, but, as she claimed, had never
been delivered. The defendant (the grantee) recorded the
deed on June 1, 1925, or slightly more than six years subsequent to its execution. The Supreme Court held that where
the delivery of a deed is placed in issue, the burden of proving
the delivery is upon the party claiming under the deed, and
that "there is no presumption of the delivery of a deed where
it is not recorded until long after its date".
For all practical purposes, title examiners and others interested in real property titles must henceforth require record
proof of the delivery of deeds appearing in the chain of title
where a "long time" has elapsed between the date of execution and the date of recording. Until the Supreme Court or
the legislature has defined what is not a "long time" as a matter of law, or where the line lies between a "long time and a
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short or reasonable time, title examiners and persons affected
by this rule will be forced to make their own estimate as to
what is a reasonable time within which to record such an instrument and thereby preserve the presumption of delivery
of the same arising out of its proper acknowledgment and its
being placed of record. A longer time may be allowed to
record an instrument executed in California affecting lands
in Denver than would be allowed to record an instrument
executed in Denver affecting lands in Denver. The principles
responsible for the statutes affecting the presentation of checks
to banking houses as provided in the Negotiable Instruments
Law may be considered in deciding this question.
Many lawyers have been accustomed, when representing
a purchaser of real estate under an installment payment contract, to require that the seller place in escrow a warranty
deed in favor of the purchaser of the premises, the same to be
delivered to him upon payment of the final installment of the
purchase price. Very often such contracts run over a period
of many years, and yet, in view of this decision, it is doubtful
if such a purchaser's title is marketable if he has recorded a
warranty deed a long time subsequent to its execution with
nothing of record to establish the reason for the delay and the
regular delivery of the deed. A marketable title being one
which is established by the records alone without additional
proof and aided only by proper presumptions of law, no title
is marketable which is based upon a deed as to which there
is no presumption of delivery in view of this case and the decisions therein mentioned.
How may we draw escrow agreements involving deeds
to be delivered a long time subsequent to the execution thereof
so that the delivery will be properly established of record?
The following method is suggested. The escrow agreement
should provide that in the event of the delivery of the deed
to the grantee, the escrow holder should make an affidavit to
the effect that he had delivered the deed to the grantee in
accordance with the terms of the escrow agreement and following full performance of the terms of the contract of sale.
The escrow agreement should further provide that the execution and recording of said affidavit should constitute conclusive evidence of the delivery of the deed to the grantee in
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accordance with the terms of the escrow agreement. The contract of sale, of course, should set out the terms of the escrow
and the escrow agreement itself might be embodied in the contract of sale. An affidavit is not conclusive evidence unless
made such by an agreement between the parties whose interests are involved. To record the affidavit of an escrow
holder in the absence of such an agreement making said affidavit conclusive evidence would be an empty gesture. Without an agreement making the affidavit of the escrow holder
conclusive evidence it seems that a new deed or a new acknowledgment attached to the old deed must be obtained. If
a new deed cannot be obtained from the grantor because of his
refusal to execute the same or on account of his death, a quiet
title decree should be required.
To recapitulate: The 1927 Statute makes the acknowledgment and recording of a deed prima facie evidence of delivery. In the above mentioned case the Supreme Court has
held that this presumption fails where a long time expires
between the date of execution and the date of recording the
deed, and that the burden of proving delivery is upon the one
claiming under the deed where delivery is placed in issue.
If the burden of proving delivery is upon the one claiming
under the deed and he is not aided by any presumption of law,
then oral or written evidence of delivery must be produced
by him and the title is not marketable until proper record
proof of delivery is made. It is difficult to determine whether
any curative statutes change the above rule where many years
have elapsed since the date of recording the deed, but space
does-not permit me to discuss those principles in this article.
The case of Phelps vs. Phelps, 71 Colorado, at page 343,
illustrates the possible practical application of the doctrine
of Larison vs. Taylor. In the Phelps case, the father executed
a warranty deed in favor of his children for a ranch property
upon Which he resided, and delivered it to his attorney absolutely and unconditionally with complete instructions to
deliver the same to his children upon his death. He then
continued to exercise control and dominion over the ranch
until he died some months later. Upon his death the attorney
delivered the deed to the children, whereupon the grantor's
widow brought this quiet title suit to establish her statutory
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right to one-half of said premises upon the theory that the
delivery was not complete until the deed was handed by the
attorney to the children after the death of the grantor, because
the grantor continued to exercise dominion and control over
the premises in question after the execution of the deed and
until his death, and because there was no acceptance of the
deed by the grantees and consequently no delivery during the
life time of the grantor. The lower Court and the Supreme
Court of Colorado agreed with this view and the widow was
allowed her statutory one-half. In this connection the following portion of the opinion is interesting:
"It is urged, however, that inasmuch as the conveyance was beneficial to
the grantees, their acceptance will be presumed, and with such acceptance the
title vested in them. But that presumption obtains only where the facts are
known. Where the facts and 'the attendant circumstances are shown, the
question must be determined from them; there is no room for presumption.'
Knox vs. Clark, 15 Colo. App. 356, 62 Pac. 334.
"In the case cited the question was further discussed, and the court
pointed out that if 'between the date of a deed and its acceptance, rights of
third parties attached to the property, those rights will be superior to and
prevail over the title of the subsequently assenting grantee'.

Further discussing what constitutes an acceptance by the
grantee, the court said:
" 'The difficulty arises where one party undertakes to make a conveyance
to another without the latter's knowledge, and without any previous understanding that the act should be done. The filing of the deed bythe grantor
for record, does not, of itself, constitute a delivery. If the recorder is the
agent of the grantee to receive the deed, then, of course, his acceptance would
be the act of his principal. But where the latter has no knowledge that such
an instrument was contemplated, or that it was made, he can have no agent
to receive it; and until, after acquiring knowledge of its existence, he in some
way signifies his approval of the act, there is no delivery of the deed.'

"The rights of the widow attached under the statute at the instant of her
husband's death, and the acceptance of the deed thereafter by the grantees
named in it was subject to the rights of defendant in error."

If a title examiner had examined this title a few days or
a few weeks following the date this deed was recorded and if
a long time had elapsed between the date of execution of the
deed and the date of recording, he would have refused to pass
the title until proper record proof was made of delivery, and
an investigation would have disclosed the facts and protected
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the person for whom he was examining. On the other hand,
if he had not raised this question, the widow would not have
been estopped to assert her claim even as against a so-called
innocent purchaser for value if she had proceeded with due
diligence, because she could have maintained that the long
period of time between the date of the execution of the instrument and the date of recording gave notice of non-delivery
so that the purchaser was not an innocent purchaser for value.
"A knowledge of facts sufficient to put a prudent person upon
inquiry is constructive notice of all facts which might have
been ascertained by such inquiry or investigation." Tibbetts
vs. Terrill, 44 Colo. 104.
It would be interesting to know how many deeds are now
reposing in the hands of private or corporate escrow holders
awaiting delivery upon the death of some individual or upon
the payment of the last installment of the purchase price which
will not be made until a "long time" after the date of the
execution of the instrument. It would be interesting to know
how many deeds are reposing in the private vaults of husbands
and wives or other persons, which deeds the parties intend to
record prior to or following the death of the grantor and in
any event a "long time" after the execution of the instrument.
The title examiner, however, must report the title to property
affected by such deeds to be unmarketable, unless record proof
of delivery appears.

THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL VS. JESUS OF
NAZARETH
By F. L. Grant of the Denver Bar

I

(A reply to the Article in the August Dicta)

WAS in the act of reading "The Trial of Jesus," written
by a non-Christian, a learned East Indian, Dr. Srinivassa
Aiyar, when the August copy of Dicta was laid on my
desk, and in which appeared an account of the trial of Jesus
by Robert L. Stearns. Like my younger brother in the law
I also am too modest to attempt to discuss this trial along
theological lines nor in fact will I attempt to discuss it learnedly along legal lines, and what I now have to say is merely repeating as nearly as possible so as to give continuity to the
article, "The Trial of Jesus," as I was reading it, because Dr.
Aiyar takes just the contrary view from that set forth by
brother Stearns, namely that the trial of Jesus was conducted
legally and that he was legally convicted and sentenced.
In brother Stearns' article I was inclined to think he
merged the two trials, or rather gave me the belief that the
trial before Pontius Pilate for treason against the Roman law
was merely a continuation of the trial of Jesus before the Jewish Sanhedrin.
Dr. Aiyar takes the position that they are separate and
distinct; that the first trial before the Sanhedrin brought under the Jewish law for blasphemy when Jesus said "I will
destroy this temple that is made with hands and within three
days will build another made without hands," and also that
of pretending to be the son of God, failed through the action
of Pontius Pilate who completely disposed of that charge
when he returned a final judgment, "I find no fault in this
man at all." The other trial, not upon blasphemy heard under
the Jewish law, was for treason to the State of Rome, based
upon an entirely different charge and brought under the
Roman law because of the specific charge made against Jesus
as found in a single verse of St. Luke. (St. Luke 23-2.)
"We found this fellow perverting the nation and forbidding to give
tribute to Caesar, saying that he himself is Christ, a king."

In view of the foregoing let us now take up Dr. Aiyar's
article, in which he says:
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"It must be borne in mind at all times that these two trials
of Jesus were separate and independent so far as the charges,
judges, and jurisdiction were concerned, and that the only
common elements were the persons of the accusers and the
accused.
Under the law as then existing, as applied to Roman
criminal trials, the first step was the filing of an application
with the presiding magistrate for permission to bring the
alleged criminal charge against a certain person. In case the
accused was caught red-handed or if he happened to be within
the forum then the accusation was made direct. Like the
Jewish law, Roman jurisprudence at this time did not know
states' attorneys or public prosecutors as that application is
made today. Any private citizen whether one of the accusers
or not might take upon himself the public prosecution in behalf of the government. It was, however, the law that but
one prosecutor could appear unless there was more than one
crime charged. With the accused before the court, he could
then be interrogated at length concerning the facts of the
crime. This proceeding, generally speaking, was thus in the
nature of a modern grand jury inquisition, and concluded the
preliminary step.
The penalty imposed under the Roman law for the crime
of treason was crucification. This form of punishment while
unknown to the ancient Hebrews had long been in force in
the domain of Caesar, indeed, it may be said for very many
years before his time. The ancient Egyptians practiced it.
So did the Carthaginians, Persians, Germans, Assyrians, and
Greeks, as well as the Romans themselves. History records
the fact that the Romans employed this form of punishment
on a gigantic scale, the Roman General Varlus having crucified two thousand Jews in one day at the gates of Jerusalem.
At the close of the war with Spartacus, the gladiator, ten
thousand slaves were crucified. This was meted out to such
as were guilty of robbery, piracy, perjury, sedition, assassination and treason."
The indictment which was brought against Jesus is contained in a single verse in St. Luke, "And they began to accuse him, saying, 'We found this fellow perverting the nation,
and forbidding to give tribute to Caesar, saying that he him-
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self is Christ, the King.' " Pilate took cognizance of this accusation: there could be no mistake as to the nature of the
charge, or the meaning of the language. It was clearly high
treason against Caesar. No greater crime was known to
Roman law.
In defining treason Ulpian says: "Majestatis crimen
illud est quod adversus populum Romanum vel adversus
securitatem ejus committitur." (Digest xlviii. 4) Practically
the same definition is admirably given by Cicero, and will be
found in De Inventione ii 17. A fair translation of the above
would read, "Treason is an insult to the dignity and an attack
upon the sovereignty."
It should be borne in mind that at this time Tiberius
Caesar was Emperor of Rome; he was a morbid tyrant, fretful and suspicious. He had no love for pernicious activity, or
political disturbance. While it is true that Christianity was
not on trial before Pilate, it must be remembered that the
Creator of Christianity was, and the same legal principles
were extant and applicable in A. D. 30 that years afterward
brought the followers of Nazarene and the Roman State into
mortal conflict.
We believe it to be true that the Roman law applicable
to the trial of Jesus and which formed the basis of the complaint against him was the lex Julia Majestatis, which first
became operative 48 B. C. Under this law, a claim of equal
standing with the King, or ruler, constituted treason and was
subject to the death penalty.
The priestly accusers appear before the Roman judge.
They had been turned down so far as their first wishes were
concerned and the action of the Great Sanhedrin in condemning Jesus had not been confirmed; order was had in court and
Pilate from the bema asked:
"What accusation bring ye against this man?"
The words ring with Roman authority and administrative capacity. Then the chief priests and scribes made reply:
"If he were not a malefactor, we would not have delivered him up unto thee."
Meaning that if he were not guilty of offence, they would
not have presented him for trial. They meant to convey to
the mind of Pilate that while the judgment of the Sanhedrin
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had been set aside, yet that Jesus was amenable to the laws
of the Roman Empire.
Pilate clearly disgusted with the accusers of Jesus, and
with their persistency in insisting upon his punishment, in a
tone of contemptuous scorn said:
"Take ye him and judge him according to your law."
Undoubtedly Pilate intended that Jesus should be taken
by his accusers and tried for some minor offence, the penalty
for which the Jews were already empowered to execute. This
seems to be clearly shown to be the understanding of the chief
priests and scribes as shown by their reply:
"It is not lawful for us to put any man to death." (John
xviii. 31.)
Nothing short of a death penalty would do; the crime
they were about to charge him with in the Roman forum was
one which knew of no other penalty. When the crime of
treason was charged, Pilate in the very nature of things, could
not say, "I do not wish to meddle in this matter." A specific
charge having been made, he could not but assume cognizance
of the case, arid then it was that the indictment as presented
was urged. It is given in a single verse of St. Luke (Luke
xxiii. 2.)
"We found this fellow perverting the nation, and forbidding to give tribute to Caesar, saying that he himself is
Christ, a King."
Here was a charge which was in effect a political offense.
It was entirely different than the religious accusation from
which Jesus had just been freed.
The first charge that he was perverting the nation, while
general in its character, and indefinite, was undoubtedly
against the Roman law. It was sedition, one of the forms of
treason.
The second charge that he had forbidden to give tribute
to Caesar was much more serious. This in itself was a form
of treason. It was an open defiance of the laws of the Roman
Empire. More than that: Coming from the source it did,
it was a direct denial of Roman sovereignty in Palestine.
But the greatest of all the charges made, was found in the
accusation that the prisoner claimed to be "Christ, a King."
This was high treason against Caesar; it was the greatest
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offence known, to the law of the Romans. As a loyal deputy
of the Emperor, Pilate could not ignore the charge.
At the examination which followed, the Roman governor
brushed aside the first two charges as not worthy of serious
consideration. Pilate must have thought if this fellow pretends to be a king as Simon did before him, if the prisoner says
that Judea has a right to have a King of its own other than
Caesar, then this is indeed treason.
All the Evangelists beginning with John xviii, 34 give
substantially the same account of the interrogation of Jesus
within the palace walls by Pilate. Question after question
was asked and adroitly answered. Pilate said, "Art thou
King of the Jews?" and Jesus evaded the question by inquiring
himself, "Sayest thou this thing of thyself, or did others tell
it thee of me?" In other words, Jesus wanted to know whether
the question was asked from a Roman or a Jewish standpoint.
Pilate quickly answered, "Am I a Jew?" and to this Jesus
replied, "My Kingdom is not of this world."
He must have meant that there could be no possible
rivalry between himself and Caesar, and yet indirectly he had
proclaimed himself as Master of a Kingdom. To this Pilate
put the question, "Art thou a King then?" and Jesus in effect
answered, "you have correctly stated it. I am a King. I was
born to be one."
The examination at this point was interrupted by witnesses and prosecutors who urged new accusations, saying "He
stirreth up the people, teaching throughout all Jewry, beginning from Galilee to this place." The evidence taken there
indicated that Jesus was a Galilean, so Pilate in view of that
fact, sent Jesus to be tried by the governor of the province to
which he belonged. This was Herod, Tetrarch of Galilee,
who at that very moment was in Jerusalem in attendance upon
the Passover feasts. Under the escort of an attachment of the
Praetorian soldiery, Jesus was led to the palace of the Macabees for further hearing and trial.
None of the technicalities that might be urged in relation
to the trial of Jesus before the Great Sanhedrin can apply to
this hearing before either Herod or Pilate in Roman jurisdiction. It did not matter under the law whether the hearing
was conducted the day before the Sabbath, or whether it was

DICTA

on a feast day. It was quite immaterial whether the morning
sacrifices had been had, or whether any of the many minor
objections which are said to constitute "illegality," in the Jewish trial, were noted. Jesus was now on trial charged with an
offence distinctly against the Roman law. He was in a Roman
court, and if convicted the punishment which would be meted
out to him would be under the Roman law.
To Herod Antipas, Tetrarch of Galilee, Jesus was led
to be judged. Herod was a typical Oriental prince. He himself was the murderer of John the Baptist, and as compared
with him Pilate unquestionably was eminently respectable.
Just what transpired during that hearing, history does not
record. Herod undoubtedly thought that Jesus had been sent
there for a purpose, and while he did not wish to excite the
enmity of Caesar, by dismissing the accused, he feared in his
soul to find him guilty as charged. His treatment of Jesus
indicated that he believed him to be a clever juggler, a magician, a sleight-of-hand operator, possibly a ventriloquist,
whose powers of entertainment were very fine. "Then he
questioned him with many words, but he answered him nothing." (Luke xxiii. 9.)
Herod found himself in the position which required that
he continue and conclude the examination of Jesus. "And the
chief priests and scribes stood by and vehemently accused
him." (Luke xxxii. 10).
A careful study of all history indicates that Herod enraged that a simple Galilean peasant would not seriously treat
his questions, that by his silence he denied his jurisdiction, and
considering that he had been mocked, then found that Jesus
was guilty and caused him to be arrayed in a gorgeous robe
and turned him back to Pilate, the procurator, for sentence.
On his return to Pilate, a demand was made of the Procurator that he cause the death of Jesus in consequence of the
finding of Herod. To satisfy himself, Jesus was called within
the Temple by Pilate, and asked "Whence art thou?" Undoubtedly the Roman Governor was hoping that he would receive a denial that the accused was a Galilean, which would
thereby have rendered the finding of Herod illegal, because
of lack of jurisdiction, but Jesus answered nothing. He would
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not explain nor justify himself. Seeing which his accusers
framed their last menace in these words:
"If thou let this man go, thou art not Caesar's friend;
whosoever maketh himself a King, speaketh against Caesar."
A demand was made upon him "Crucify himl Crucify
himl" The hundreds surrounding Pilate understood full well
the penalty for a charge as serious as that of treason. There
was but one answer to the finding of guilty, crucification.
Three times Pilate asked of those who were about him, "What
evil hath he done?" and in thundering tones his answer came
"He has been guilty of proclaiming himself a King; he hath
set himself up against Caesar; he is guilty of treason against
the Empire of which you are a servant and officer. Order him
to be crucified I"
In accordance with the finding and upon the evidence
submitted, coupled with the recommendation of Herod, Pilate
delivered to his accusers, Jesus to be crucified. The soldiers
of the Governor took him into the common hall where he
was surrounded by all the soldiery. They stripped him, and
in accord with the custom of that age, and that country, they
put over his shoulders a scarlet robe; they platted a crown of
thorns and put it upon his head; they placed a reed in his
right hand as though to mock him; the assembled multitude
bowed their knees before him, saying "Hail! King of the
Jews I"
Jesus was spat upon, and mocked, after which he was led
away and crucified.
We have now considered the elements of law and fact as
related to the legality of the Roman trial. The powers and
duties of Pilate as procurator of Judea and presiding judge
at the trial are of course involved in this consideration. The
general principles of Roman provincial administration, the
legal and political status of the Jew subject, the exact requirements of criminal procedure in Roman capital cases, and in
the provinces throughout that Empire at the date of the crucification.
Analyzing the case from the viewpoint of the jurist, and
in the absence of all question as to the divinity of the accused,
comparing the requirements of the law with the actualities
of the case, we can come to no other conclusion than that the
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proceedings against Jesus before Pilate on the charge preferred against him, on the last trial, in the Roman court, were
legally conducted.
Let it be understood in this analysis that it must be held
and borne in mind that in reviewing this case or any other,
errors cannot be presumed that do not affirmatively appear upon the record. It is rather to be presumed that what should
have been done, was done. Hence we find, that Pilate acted in
strict obedience to the requirements of Roman law in trying
Jesus. The legal presumption is that a bench of judges helped
Pilate to conduct this trial, that they were in and about the
Praetorium and actually took part in the proceedings. This
inference is strengthened by the fact that Pilate called Jesus
into the judgment hall of the Palace in order to examine him.
(Geikie, "The Life and Words of Christ," vol. xii, p. 532.)
The legal presumption js that the witnesses who were called
against Jesus, gave competent testimony, and that the weight
of the evidence submitted together with the admissions of the
accused, was sufficient to warrant the court in finding him
guilty and imposing the penalty provided through due process
of law.
I must agree with many noted historians in holding that
it was Pilate's duty to maintain peace and order in Judea and
to maintain Roman power; in doing so, he was clearly within
his prerogative if ample evidence was submitted in regular
form, in carrying out the mandate of the law. In this contention I take no cognizance of the divinity of the prisoner
before him, or of his Messiahlike qualities. In the discussion
of these questions, I have treated him as a man alone,-a
teacher and Jew. Undoubtedly many will disagree in the
position. assumed. Let homage be paid to the character and
spirituality of Jesus by those who will, those of other beliefs
will not question the honesty of their intentions and acts."
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PROMISSORY NOTE.-AGREEMENTS--No. 12,196-Abercrombie vs. The Bear Canon Coal Co.-Decided June 10, 1929.
Facts.-An action was brought upon a promissory note at
the bottom of which was the following notation, "This note
is issued under special agreement with the company and limited thereby". The complaint alleges that the note was not at
any time subject to any special agreement.
Held.-That when suit is brought upon a promissory note
and there is a reference to a special agreement, the plaintiff
must allege and prove performance of the terms of that agreement as a condition precedent to the bringing of the suit.
Having failed to do so the defendant's demurrer was properly
sustained.
PROOF - No. 12,075 - Denver & Salt Lake
Railway Co. vs. Wim. Mullin-DecidedJune 10, 1929.
Facts.-Plaintiff, a brakeman in the employ of defendant,
lost an arm as the result of an accident. He sued the defendant and recovered judgment of $12,500. The evidence showed
that plaintiff was a brakeman on defendant's train proceeding
westward in the dark with river on its left and a mountain on
the right. It had passed through a cut and was entering a
sidetrack. The plaintiff was on top of an oil tank car. The
conductor noticed sparks under some of the cars, and saw that
some of the cars were derailed. The rear brakeman pulled
the air. The emergency brake valve was applied whereupon
the train came to a sudden stop. Plaintiff was thrown from the
car, and his left arm was caught under a wheel and almost
severed. There are two claims of negligence. One the rock
on the track, and the other the sudden stop.
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Held.-The burden was upon the plaintiff to show negligence on the part of the defendant either in permitting the
rock to be on the track, or in causing the sudden stop of the
train. There was no evidence of any negligence on the part
of the defendant in permitting the rock to appear on the track,
and the lower court having submitted the question of negligence to the jury on both matters, the judgment of the lower
court must be reversed and the cause remanded.

PRACTICE-CHANGE OF VENUE-No. 12,244-The People vs.

Eldred-Decided June 10, 1929.
Facts.-A civil action was brought against the defendant
and his bondsman to recover damages for official misconduct.
The case was brought in Denver. It was removed to Fremont
County for trial on motion of defendant. Plaintiff thereafter
moved to return it to Denver. Motion was denied.
Held.-The writ of error will be dismissed, because there
is no final order or judgment.
WATER RIGHTS--SEEPAGE-No.

11752-Nevius vs. Smith.

Decided June 24, 1929.
Facts.-Plaintiff appropriated water which he claimed
was from a seepage stream arising on the lands of the defendant. His appropriation was adjudicated. Defendant claims
that this percolating seepage and spring water is subject under the statute to the paramount right of the owner on land
on which the water arises to use them when occasion requires,
and that the adjudication must be regarded as subject to such
right. The facts further show that the water arising on the
land of the defendant actually reached the river, or would
have reached it if not taken by the plaintiff.
Held.-That the statute clearly allows the appropriation
of seepage and spring water, and that the water having once
been appropriated the statute cannot make it possible for the
owner of the land where it arises to reclaim it at any time
without compensation. Even the preferred right to the use
of water for domestic purposes does not allow the taking of
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said water previously appropriated for other purposes without either the consent of the appropriator or condemnation.
Further the constitution gives river water to the people subject to appropriation, and this water clearly was river water.

WATER

RIGHTS-PRIORITY-No.

12057-Denver vs. Colo.

Land & Livestock Co. et al.-DecidedJune 17, 1929.
Facts.-The city has certain water rights for power and
irrigation purposes, which water is diverted at a certain point
on the Platte River, and the city attempts to change the point
of diversion several miles upstream, and offers to reduce its
appropriation to replace leakage. The cause was tried on
the issue of whether or not the change of the point of diversion would injuriously affect any of the defendants and their
vested rights, and the finding was that the change would injuriously affect the vested rights of other appropriations.
Held.-The burden was on the city to prove that the
proposed change would not impair the vested rights of other
appropriators on the stream.
PURPOSES-No. 12089-Johnston vs.
Colorado State Bureau of Child and Animal Protection.Decided July 1, 1929.
Facts.-The will of Fred H. Forrester was admitted to
probate in the County Court under which after specific bequests the remainder of his estate was left to the Colorado
State Bureau of Child and Animal Protection to use the same
"in perpetuity in affording relief to hungry, thirsty, abused
and neglected cattle, horses, dogs and cats in Denver and in
Colorado at large, etc." The opponents of the will contended
that this created a perpetuity and was void under the statute
against perpetuities, and only one question is involved. Does
the purpose of the bequest create a charitable use?
Held.-That the bequest as designated in the will did
create a charitable use. That the relief of dumb animals is
a wholesome purpose in which the public at large is interested
WILLS-CHARITABLE
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and that for those reasons the use being charitable the bequest
is good, and is not affected by the statute against perpetuities.
TORT-No. 12302-Barbaravs. Meyer et al.-Decided June
17, 1929.
Facts.-Plaintiff brought an action to recover money
alleged to belong to him, which defendants converted to their
own use. Defendants were officers of a corporation.
Held.-In Scott vs. Schook 80 Colo. 40 the court did
not hold that the defendants were liable solely because they
were directors of the corporation, and the company is not a
defendant.

FOR RENT
OFFICE ROOM FOR USE BY LAWYER

MAin 5193

College man with secretarial experience and some knowledge of
law seeks place in law office affording opportunity to prepare for bar.
Good typist, fair at dictation, extensive business experience. Will
start at nominal salary if proposition is permanent.
W. G. H. c/o "Dicta", 828 Symes Bldg., Denver.

